Ali Paya
Abstract
The present paper pursues three general objectives. In the first place, it tries to present a succinct account of the phenomenon of modernity. Secondly, it goes some way towards producing a brief and critical assessment of some aspects of this phenomenon in the context of Iran. And, thirdly, it offers ...
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The present paper pursues three general objectives. In the first place, it tries to present a succinct account of the phenomenon of modernity. Secondly, it goes some way towards producing a brief and critical assessment of some aspects of this phenomenon in the context of Iran. And, thirdly, it offers some guidelines for constructing a model for developing modernity in Iran. Throughout, I shall try to be as brief as possible. This means, among other things, that the reader should lower his/her expectation of the paper to a realistic level. Any discussion of the complex phenomenon of modernity in a limited space provided for a short paper would involve, inevitably, resorting to measures such as simplification and omission. The paper does not make any claim with regard to producing solutions for the theoretical difficulties of the issue of Iranian experience of modernity. In fact, it is the present author’s firm conviction that if the present contribution to this debate could shed even a faint light on some of the lesser aspects of this issue and draw the attention of the readers to some of its not-very-well-known angles, and, by doing so, invites the readers to think afresh about this phenomenon, then the main goal of the paper is achieved.
ali paya
Abstract
The issue of developing a rational framework for not only assessing scientific theories but also providing effective guidelines for satisfactory progress of science lies at the heart of modern methodological debates in the field of philosophy of science. During the past few decades, realists and anti-realists ...
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The issue of developing a rational framework for not only assessing scientific theories but also providing effective guidelines for satisfactory progress of science lies at the heart of modern methodological debates in the field of philosophy of science. During the past few decades, realists and anti-realists of every hue have tried to produce viable theories for science. Any viable theory of science ought to be able to provide, among other things, satisfactory answers for the three following questions, namely, "What must the world be like for scientific knowledge not only to be possible but also to have the greatest chance of progress?"; "What aim and structure must science have to be successful, i.e., to give us knowledge of the observable as well as unobservable aspects of the physical universe?"; and "How must the methodology be like to maximize the success-rate of science?" In what follows, making use of the ideas of a number of realists writers including Karl Popper, Roy Bhaskar and Nicholas Maxwell, I shall try to tackle the above questions. The upshot of the arguments of the paper is that a new type of realist approach, mostly based on the views of mature Popper (Popper post 1960s) but also enriched by the insights offered by some other realist writers provides not only a powerful framework for making rational sense of science but also an effective research tradition for the advancement of science
ali paya
Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to sbo» that anti-realism in science, 1vhich has a1;guab/y become more fashionable in recentyears, contrary to tuha: its proponents assert, cannot make use of quantum mechanics and its impressiue achievements as a frump card in justifying its claims. I will argue ...
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The aim of the present paper is to sbo» that anti-realism in science, 1vhich has a1;guab/y become more fashionable in recentyears, contrary to tuha: its proponents assert, cannot make use of quantum mechanics and its impressiue achievements as a frump card in justifying its claims. I will argue that scientific anti-realism far from providing scientific communiry with a progressive methodologicalframeuorle is a restrictive approach wbicb would hamper scientific progress. Focusing on the historical evidence of the 1vqys in subicb quantum mechanics was deueloped, I 1vill further argue that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics due to Bohr and Heisenberg, among others, iuith its in-built anti-realistic elements provides a damning verdict against the claims of anti-realists. Following a critical assessment of a number of alternative interpretations or the calculus of quantum mechanics, I shall present realistic approaches which provide more effective and frudful conceptualframeu;orks for the advancement of research in the quantum
